8.2 Authority to Order Restitution In General
A. General Overview
In general, restitution must be ordered at sentencing and is mandatory under several penal, procedural, and regulatory provisions:
• In felony cases, the court must order on the record the dollar amount of restitution the defendant must pay to make full restitution when sentencing the defendant. MCL 769.1a(2) ; MCL 769.34(6) ; MCL 771.3(1)(e) ; MCL 780.766 ; MCR 6.425(D)(1)(f) . If ordered to pay restitution under the Code of Criminal Procedure or the CVRA at sentencing, upon parole, a parolee’s parole order must contain a condition to pay restitution. MCL 791.236(5) .
• In cases involving a juvenile offense , the court must order full restitution at the juvenile’s dispositional hearing. MCL 712A.18(7) ; MCL 712A.30(2) ; MCL 780.794 .
• In misdemeanor cases, the court must order on the record the dollar amount of restitution the defendant must pay to make full restitution when sentencing the defendant. MCL 769.1a(2) ; MCL 771.3(1)(e) ; MCL 780.826 ; MCR 6.610(G)(1)(e) .
Note: The CVRA does not authorize a court to order a defendant to pay restitution for nonserious misdemeanor convictions; restitution for nonserious misdemeanor convictions may only be ordered under the general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a(2) . People v Castillo , 337 Mich App 298, 315 (2021). The applicable provision in the misdemeanor article of the CVRA, MCL 780.826(2) , authorizes a court to order a defendant to pay restitution, and a defendant for purposes of MCL 780.826(2) is a “‘person charged with or convicted of having committed a serious misdemeanor,’” MCL 780.811(1)(c) . Castillo , 337 Mich App at 309. Therefore, the general restitution statute, MCL 769.1a(2) , provides the only authority for ordering restitution for nonserious misdemeanor convictions. Castillo , 337 Mich App at 311-312.
“Within 7 days after sentencing, the court must date and sign a written judgment of sentence that includes,” among other things, “the dollar amount of restitution that the defendant is ordered to pay.” MCR 6.427 (only applicable in felony and misdemeanor cases).
“[A] restitution order is governed by the statute in effect at the time of sentencing.” People v Lueth , 253 Mich App 670, 693 (2002) (finding that the amended statutory language of MCL 780.767(1) , which was not in effect at the time of some of the committed offenses, but was in effect at the time of sentencing, applied (eliminating the court’s obligation to consider a defendant’s ability to pay when ordering restitution)).
Note: Although the Lueth Court did not specifically address the amendment of MCL 780.795 (which also eliminated the court’s obligation to consider the defendant’s ability to pay in juvenile proceedings), its holding would presumably extend to this statute as well.
B. Responsibility for Payment
“[A] trial court can[not] require a defendant’s spouse to tender financial resources to pay a defendant’s restitution obligation[.]” People v Spears-Everett , 329 Mich App 1, 14 (2019) ( MCL 769.1a , MCL 780.766 and MCR 6.425(D) “make clear that [defendant’s spouse’s] income cannot be used to satisfy restitution[, and] . . . any indication in the trial court’s order, even if unintentional, that [defendant’s spouse] can be held liable for defendant’s restitution payments is improper”).
C. Persons or Entities Entitled to Restitution
“Except as provided in [ MCL 780.766(8) ], when sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime , the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution [ 1 ] to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction [ 2 ] or to the victim’s estate. For an offense that is resolved by assignment of the defendant to youthful trainee status, by a delayed sentence or deferred judgment of guilt, or in another way that is not an acquittal or unconditional dismissal, the court shall order the restitution required under this section.” 3 MCL 780.766(2) . See also MCL 769.1a(2) ; MCR 6.425(D)(1)(f) (requiring court, at sentencing , to “order the dollar amount of restitution that the defendant must pay to make full restitution . . .”).
Note: MCL 780.766b also requires the court to order restitution “[w]hen sentencing a defendant convicted of a [human trafficking] offense described in . . . MCL 750.462a to [MCL] 750.462h . . . for the full amount of loss suffered by the victim .” For additional information on ordering restitution in human trafficking cases, see Section 8.14 .
MCL 780.766(8) requires payment of restitution to entities other than the victim in certain circumstances:
“The court shall order restitution to the crime victim services commission [(CVSC)] or to any individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, governmental entities, or other legal entities that have compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim to the extent of the compensation paid for that loss. The court shall also order restitution for the costs of services provided to persons or entities that have provided services to the victim as a result of the crime. Services that are subject to restitution under this subsection include, but are not limited to, shelter, food, clothing, and transportation. . . .” See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
Note: “The Legislature intended to include insurance companies and the state as victims who may seek restitution for money paid to a victim for a defendant’s criminal act.” People v Byard , 265 Mich App 510, 513 (2013), citing People v Orweller , 197 Mich App 136, 139 (1992). “The amount of restitution to be paid by a defendant must be based on the actual loss suffered by the victim, not the amount paid by an insurer or other entity.” People v Bell , 276 Mich App 342, 347 (2007). For additional information on determining the victim’s amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .”
“[T]he statutory language [of MCL 780.766(2) ] does not include any mitigating language predicated on the preclusion of recovery, or a finding of no damages, in a separate suit[;]” the only exception to the court’s statutorily mandated duty to order restitution to a victim is under MCL 780.766(8) : “when ‘the victim or victim’s estate has received or is to receive compensation for that loss[.]’” People v Lee (Edward) , 314 Mich App 266, 274-275 (2016) (“an award of restitution may [not] be precluded by the result of civil proceedings[;] . . . the fact that civil damages are not available . . . does not necessarily mean that restitution is also unavailable[]”).
“[A]n order of restitution shall require that all restitution to a victim or victim’s estate under the order be made before any restitution to any other person or entity under that order is made. [However, t]he court shall not order restitution to be paid to a victim or victim’s estate if the victim or victim’s estate has received or is to receive compensation for that loss, and the court shall state on the record with specificity the reasons for its action.” MCL 780.766(8) . See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
An individual or entity that has compensated a victim need not file a claim to receive restitution under MCL 780.766(8) . Byard , 265 Mich App at 513 (finding that “there [was] no statutory requirement that a party [who compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim] file a claim to receive restitution[]”).
“If a person or entity entitled to restitution under [ MCL 780.766 ] cannot be located, refuses to claim the restitution within 2 years after the date on which he or she could have claimed the restitution, or refuses to accept the restitution, the restitution to which that person or entity is entitled shall be deposited in the crime victim’s rights fund created under . . . MCL 780.904 , or its successor fund.” MCL 780.766(21) . See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
2. Juvenile Proceedings
“Except as provided in [ MCL 780.794(8) ], at the dispositional hearing or sentencing for an offense , the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other disposition or penalty authorized by law, that the juvenile make full restitution [ 4 ] to any victim of the juvenile’s course of conduct that gives rise to the disposition or conviction or to the victim’s estate. For an offense that is resolved informally by means of a consent calendar diversion or by another informal method that does not result in a dispositional hearing, by assignment to youthful trainee status, by a delayed sentence or deferred judgment of guilt, or in another way that is not an acquittal or unconditional dismissal, the court shall order the restitution required under this section.” 5 MCL 780.794(2) . See also MCL 712A.2f(7)(a) , requiring upon issuance of a written consent calendar case plan, the court to include, among other provisions, “a requirement that the juvenile pay restitution under the [CVRA][;]” 6 MCL 712A.18(7) , requiring the court to order the juvenile or the juvenile’s parent to pay restitution as provided in MCL 712A.30 and MCL 780.794 ; MCL 780.786b(1) , requiring “[a]s part of any other order removing any case from the adjudicative process, the court [to] order the juvenile or the juvenile’s parents to provide full restitution as provided in [ MCL 780.794 ].” (Emphasis added.) 7
MCL 780.794(8) requires payment of restitution to entities other than the victim in certain circumstances:
“The court shall order restitution to the [CVSC] or to any individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, governmental entities, or other legal entities that have compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim to the extent of the compensation paid for that loss. The court shall also order restitution for the costs of services provided to persons or entities that have provided services to the victim as a result of the offense. Services that are subject to restitution under this subsection include, but are not limited to, shelter, food, clothing, and transportation. . . .” MCL 780.794(8) . See also MCL 712A.30(8) .
Note: “The Legislature intended to include insurance companies and the state as victims who may seek restitution for money paid to a victim for a defendant’s criminal act.” Byard , 265 Mich App at 513, citing Orweller , 197 Mich App at 139.
“[A]n entity that compensated a victim ‘for a loss incurred by the victim’ is entitled to receive restitution ‘to the extent of the compensation paid for that loss ,’ clearly meaning the loss of the victim, not the loss of the compensating entity.” In re McEvoy , 267 Mich App 55, 76 (2005). Although the In re McEvoy Court analyzed MCL 712A.30(8) , its holding extends to MCL 780.794(8) , the corresponding CVRA provision with substantially similar language. See I n re McEvoy , 267 Mich App at 63. For additional information on determining the victim’s amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .
“[A]n order of restitution shall require that all restitution to a victim or victim’s estate under the order be made before any restitution to any other person or entity under that order is made. [However, t]he court shall not order restitution to be paid to a victim or victim’s estate if the victim or victim’s estate has received or is to receive compensation for that loss, and the court shall state on the record with specificity the reasons for its action.” MCL 780.794(8) . See also MCL 712A.30(8) .
An individual or entity that has compensated a victim need not file a claim to receive restitution under MCL 780.794(8) . See Byard , 265 Mich App at 513 (finding that “there [was] no statutory requirement that a party [who compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim] file a claim to receive restitution[]”). 8
“If a person or entity entitled to restitution under [ MCL 780.794 ] cannot be located, refuses to claim the restitution within 2 years after the date on which he or she could have claimed the restitution, or refuses to accept the restitution, the restitution to which that person or entity is entitled shall be deposited in the crime victim’s rights fund created under . . . MCL 780.904 , or its successor fund.” MCL 780.794(21) . See also MCL 712A.30(8) .
3. Misdemeanor Cases
“Except as provided in [ MCL 780.826(8) ], when sentencing a defendant convicted of a misdemeanor , the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution [ 9 ] to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction or to the victim’s estate. For an offense that is resolved by assignment of the defendant to youthful trainee status, by a delayed sentence or deferred judgment of guilt, or in another way that is not an acquittal or unconditional dismissal, the court shall order the restitution required under this section.” 10 MCL 780.826(2) . See MCL 769.1a(2) ; MCR 6.610(G)(1)(e) (requiring court, at sentencing , to “order the dollar amount of restitution that the defendant must pay to make full restitution . . .”).
MCL 780.826(8) requires payment of restitution to entities other than the victim in certain circumstances:
“The court shall order restitution to the [CVSC] or to any individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, governmental entities, or other legal entities that have compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim to the extent of the compensation paid for that loss. The court shall also order restitution for the costs of services provided to persons or entities that have provided services to the victim as a result of the misdemeanor. Services that are subject to restitution under this subsection include, but are not limited to, shelter, food, clothing, and transportation. . . .” MCL 780.826(8) . See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
Note: “The Legislature intended to include insurance companies and the state as victims who may seek restitution for money paid to a victim for a defendant’s criminal act.” Byard , 265 Mich App at 513, citing Orweller , 197 Mich App at 139. “The amount of restitution to be paid by a defendant must be based on the actual loss suffered by the victim, not the amount paid by an insurer or other entity.” People v Bell , 276 Mich App 342, 347 (2007). Although the Bell Court did not specifically address MCL 780.826(8) , its holding would presumably extend to that statute as well. For additional information on determining the victim’s amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .
“[A]n order of restitution shall require that all restitution to a victim or victim’s estate under the order be made before any restitution to any other person or entity under that order is made. [However, t]he court shall not order restitution to be paid to a victim or victim’s estate if the victim or victim’s estate has received or is to receive compensation for that loss, and the court shall state on the record with specificity the reasons for its action.” MCL 780.826(8) . See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
An individual or entity that has compensated a victim need not file a claim to receive restitution under MCL 780.826(8) . See Byard , 265 Mich App at 513 (finding that “there [was] no statutory requirement that a party [who compensated the victim or the victim’s estate for a loss incurred by the victim] file a claim to receive restitution[]”). 11
“If a person or entity entitled to restitution under [ MCL 780.826 ] cannot be located, refuses to claim the restitution within 2 years after the date on which he or she could have claimed the restitution, or refuses to accept the restitution, the restitution to which that person or entity is entitled shall be deposited in the crime victim’s rights fund created under . . . MCL 780.904 , or its successor fund.” MCL 780.826(18) . See also MCL 769.1a(8) .
D. Victim is a Minor
“If the victim is a minor, the order of restitution shall require the defendant to pay to a parent of the victim an amount that is determined to be reasonable for any of the following that are actually incurred or reasonably expected to be incurred by the parent as a result of the crime :
(a) Homemaking and child care expenses.
(b) Income loss not ordered to be paid under [ MCL 780.766(4)(h) , MCL 780.794(4)(h) , or [ MCL 780.826(4)(h) ].
(d) Lodging or housing.
(f) Any other cost incurred in exercising the rights of the victim or a parent under [the CVRA].” MCL 780.766(24) ; MCL 780.794(24) ; MCL 780.826(21) .
E. Individuals Not Entitled to Restitution
A person charged with a crime , offense , or serious misdemeanor arising out of the same transaction as the charge against the defendant or juvenile is ineligible for restitution. See MCL 780.752(3) , MCL 780.781(3) , and MCL 780.811(3) , which specifically excludes individuals charged with a crime or offense arising out of the same transaction as the defendant’s or juvenile’s charge from exercising privileges and rights established for crime victims .
Incarcerated individuals are not eligible to exercise privileges and rights established for crime victims. Note, however, that incarcerated individuals may submit a written statement for the court’s consideration at sentencing. MCL 780.752(4) ; MCL 780.811(4) .
F. Impact of Other Proceedings Affecting Court’s Obligation to Order Restitution
1. Civil Proceedings
“The existence of [a] civil settlement between [the defendant] and the [victim] does not relieve the sentencing court of its statutorily mandated duty to order restitution. Bell , 276 Mich App at 349-350 (finding that “[a] civil agreement between [the defendant] and the [victim] that limits claims against [the defendant] should not be construed as establishing a waiver of a mandatory provision of criminal law requiring the payment of restitution to the victims of crimes or to entities that have compensated those victims[]”).
“[T]he existence of [pending civil] litigation [between the victim and the defendant] should not automatically preclude an order of full restitution.” People v Avignone , 198 Mich App 419, 423 (1993) (although pending civil actions between the victim and the defendant “would accurately determine the amount of [the] defendants’ liability to [the victim,] . . . the pending litigation alone was a[n in] sufficient reason to justify ordering less than full restitution[]”). 12
“[A]n award of restitution may [not] be precluded by the result of civil proceedings[;] . . . the fact that civil damages are not available . . . does not necessarily mean that restitution is also unavailable.” People v Lee (Edward) , 314 Mich App 266, 275-276 (2016) (“the mere fact that the [victim] may not be entitled to civil damages . . . does not render the trial court’s restitution order erroneous or excessive or establish that the [victim] did not incur any loss due to [the] defendant’s conduct[]”).
“[T]he amount of civil damages to which one is entitled is not necessarily equivalent to the amount of loss that one has experienced for purposes of the CVRA, and ‘the statutory scheme for restitution is separate and independent of any damages that may be sought in a civil proceeding.’” People v Lee (Edward) , 314 Mich App at 278-279 (finding that the victim was not collaterally estopped from seeking restitution where the issue in the criminal case, “whether the [victim was] entitled under the CVRA to restitution as a victim that suffered a loss due to [the] defendant’s criminal conduct[,]” was not the same as the issue decided in the civil case that barred the victim from seeking civil damages because the victim’s claim arose out of a debt that was extinguished as a matter of law), quoting In re McEvoy , 267 Mich App 55, 67 (2005).
2. Plea Agreements
“[B]ecause restitution is . . . mandatory under the CVRA, restitution must be ordered in addition to any other penalty, regardless of the terms of a plea agreement.” Bell , 276 Mich App at 347, citing People v Ronowski , 222 Mich App 58, 61 (1997).
G. Restitution Must Be Based on Loss Resulting From Offender’s Criminal Course of Conduct
“Although courts must order defendants to pay ‘full restitution,’ their authority to order restitution is not limitless[;] . . . the losses included in a restitution order must be the result of [the] defendant’s criminal course of conduct.” People v Garrison , 495 Mich 362, 372 (2014) (concluding that MCL 780.766(1) ’s definition of “‘victim’ as ‘an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial, or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime’” and MCL 780.766(2) ’s limitation of ordering restitution “only for damage or loss that results from a ‘defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction . . . [,]’” limits the sentencing court’s authority to include in a restitution order only the losses that are “the result of [the] defendant’s criminal course of conduct[]”). 13 See also People v Neilly , ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024) (“Restitution under MCL 769.1a and MCL 780.766 is tailored to the harm suffered by the victim rather than the defendant’s conviction or judgment of sentence.”).
Additionally, “ MCL 780.766(2) does not authorize trial courts to impose restitution based solely on uncharged conduct[;]” 14 rather, “ MCL 780.766(2) requires a direct, causal relationship between the conduct underlying the convicted offense and the amount of restitution to be awarded.” People v McKinley , 496 Mich 410, 421 (2014), overruling People v Gahan , 456 Mich 264, 270 (1997), “to the extent that [it] held that MCL 780.766(2) ‘authorizes the sentencing court to order criminal defendants to pay restitution to all victims, even if those specific losses were not the factual predicate for the conviction.’” 15 See also People v Raisbeck , 312 Mich App 759, 771-772 (2015) (citing McKinley , 496 Mich at 419-424, and holding that where the prosecutor specifically “charged [the defendant] with committing a single [racketeering] crime against 18 named individuals[,]” rather than “with committing a crime against any and all victims of her scheme[,]” the trial court “erred by ordering restitution for those individuals who were not named in the information[]”); People v Corbin , 312 Mich App 352, 361-362 (2015) (citing McKinley , 496 Mich at 419, and holding that although the defendant, when tendering his guilty plea with respect to charged criminal sexual conduct involving one victim, admitted to engaging in criminal sexual conduct with a second victim, the trial court erred in awarding restitution to the second victim where the prosecutor had voluntarily dismissed the charge involving that victim because the statute of limitations had expired).
However, neither “the rule announced in McKinley , [496 Mich at 421, which determined the court could not impose restitution for uncharged conduct under MCL 780.766(2) , n]or its analytical framework, renders unconstitutional a situation in which restitution is part of a negotiated plea agreement.” People v Foster , 319 Mich App 365, 379, 383 (2017) (“[d]efendant’s agreement to have . . . misdemeanor charges dismissed but still pay the restitution owed to [the victim] was ‘[i]n essence, . . . the act of self-conviction by the defendant in exchange for various official concessions[]’”), quoting People v Killebrew , 416 Mich 189, 199 (1982).
“The purpose of restitution is to ‘allow crime victims to recoup losses suffered as a result of criminal conduct.’” People v Newton , 257 Mich App 61, 68 (2003), quoting People v Grant (Dennis) , 455 Mich 221, 230 (1997). The following cases address whether the court had the authority to issue restitution:
• Restitution not authorized for general cost of investigating and prosecuting criminal activity: 16
• People v Wahmhoff , 319 Mich App 264, 276 (2017) (finding that the court was not authorized to order restitution to a governmental entity for the general costs of criminal investigations and prosecutions, including salary or overtime compensation paid as a cost of investigation unrelated to the particular criminal offense, or for routine purchase or maintenance costs for equipment). 17
• People v Gaines , 306 Mich App 289, 322 (2014) (finding that because the payment of costs associated with investigating a crime would occur regardless of whether the defendant committed a crime, MCL 780.766(1) did not authorize the trial court to order “restitution for officer investigation[,] . . . [the cost of] a forensic analyst[,] . . . and [the cost of] discs . . . []”). 18
• Newton , 257 Mich App at 69-70 (finding that “under the plain language of [ MCL 780.766(1) ], the general cost of investigating and prosecuting criminal activity is not direct ‘financial harm as a result of a crime’” justifying restitution to the governmental or legal entity involved in the investigation and prosecution).
• Restitution authorized for loss of specific costs:
• People v Neilly , ___ Mich ___, ___ (2024) (stating that MCL 769.1a(5) and MCL 780.766(4)(f) “specifically provide for the inclusion of payment of funeral costs in the trial court’s restitution order,” and affirming the addition of a restitution order at resentencing for defendant to reimburse the deceased victim’s family $14,895.78 for funeral expenses).
• People v Fawaz , 299 Mich App 55, 66-67 (2012) (finding that the court was authorized to order restitution to an insurance company for “costs associated with investigating a[n insured-]defendant’s illegal activity” where “the victim[-insurance company] spent time and labor costs investigating [the fire the defendant set on his home] when it could have spent those resources investigating other, non-fraudulent insurance claims[, and] [t]he resources [the victim-insurance company] spent determining that [the] defendant’s claim was fraudulent were part of the ‘actual losses suffered by the victim[-insurance company][]’). 19
• People v Allen (Regina) , 295 Mich App 277, 282-283 (2011) (finding that the court was authorized to order restitution to a medical prescription insurer for the loss of time its employee expended on investigating the defendant’s attempted prescription fraud when, even though the employee “was a salaried, full-time employee [who worked] in a department dedicated to investigating fraud[,] . . . the loss to [the victim-insurance company] was not [the employee’s] salary or the [victim-insurance company’s] budget; [the victim-insurance company would likely have incurred those costs regardless of [the defendant’s] criminal conduct[, but r]ather, it was the loss of time [that the employee spent investigating the defendant’s fraud] that amounted to a direct financial harm[]”).
• People v Crigler , 244 Mich App 420, 427 (2001) (finding that the court was authorized to order restitution to a narcotics enforcement team for the loss of “buy money” used during the commission of an unlawful drug transaction).
1 The phrase full restitution means “‘restitution that is complete and maximal.’” People v Turn , 317 Mich App 475, 479 (2016), quoting People v Garrison , 495 Mich 362, 365 (2014). For additional information on determining the amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .
2 Where the defendant’s “illegal acts involving [a victim] d[o] not give rise to [the] defendant’s convictions, [that victim] is not entitled to any restitution.” People v Corbin , 312 Mich App 352, 354 (2015) (citing People v McKinley , 496 Mich 410, 419 (2014), and holding that the trial court erred in awarding restitution where the defendant admitted to having engaged in criminal sexual conduct with a victim, but the prosecutor voluntarily dismissed the charge because the statute of limitations had expired). See Section 8.2(G) , for addition information on MCL 780.766(2) ’s requirement that restitution be based on loss resulting from the defendant’s criminal course of conduct.
3 For additional information on ordering restitution in conjunction with delayed or deferred proceedings, see Section 8.11 .
4 The phrase full restitution means “‘restitution that is complete and maximal.’” People v Turn , 317 Mich App 475, 479 (2016), quoting People v Garrison , 495 Mich 362, 365 (2014). Although the Turn case addressed MCL 780.766(2) and not MCL 780.794(2) specifically, its finding would presumably extend to MCL 780.794(2) (which contains similar language as MCL 780.766(2)) . For additional information on determining the amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .
5 For additional information on ordering restitution in conjunction with delayed or deferred proceedings, see Section 8.11 .
6 For additional information on placing a case on the consent calendar as it relates to crime victims, see Section 4.5(C) .
7 For additional information on ordering the juvenile’s parent to pay restitution, see Section 8.13 .
8 Although the Byard Court addressed MCL 780.766(8) and not MCL 780.794(8) specifically, its holding would presumably extend to MCL 780.794(8) (which contains substantially similar language as MCL 780.766(8)) .
9 The phrase full restitution means “‘restitution that is complete and maximal. People v Turn , 317 Mich App 475, 479 (2016), quoting People v Garrison , 495 Mich 362, 365 (2014). Although the Turn case addressed MCL 780.766(2) and not MCL 780.826(2) specifically, its finding would presumably extend to MCL 780.826(2) (which contains similar language as MCL 780.766(2)) . For additional information on determining the amount of restitution, see Section 8.5 .
10 For additional information on ordering restitution in conjunction with delayed or deferred proceedings, see Section 8.11 .
11 Although the Byard Court addressed MCL 780.766(8) and not MCL 780.826(8) specifically, its holding would presumably extend to MCL 780.826(8) (which contains substantially similar language as MCL 780.766(8)) .
12 Although the Avignone Court did not specifically address MCL 780.794(2) or MCL 780.826(2) , its holding would presumably extend to these statutes as well.
13 Although the Michigan Supreme Court’s holding in Garrison did not specifically address MCL 780.794 or MCL 780.826 , its holding regarding restitution orders including only losses that are “the result of [the] defendant’s criminal course of conduct[]” would presumably extend to those statutes as well.
14 The Court noted that, for purposes of the McKinley opinion, “‘uncharged conduct’ refers to criminal conduct that the defendant allegedly engaged in that was not relied on as a basis for any criminal charge and therefore was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a trier of fact.” McKinley , 496 Mich at 413 n 1.
15 The McKinley holding would presumably extend to the corresponding language in MCL 780.794(2) and MCL 780.826(2) . See McKinley , 496 Mich at 418 n 8, which states that “other statutes allowing for the assessment of restitution . . . have identical language for all relevant purposes[; s]ee, e.g., MCL 769.1a(2) ; MCL 780.826(2) .” See also People v Foster , 319 Mich App 365, 379 (2017) (“because MCL 769.1a(2) contains language identical to MCL 780.766(2) and MCL 769.1a(2) could be considered the precedential equal of MCL 780.766(2) , the rule set forth in McKinley for MCL 780.766(2) should extend to MCL 769.1a(2) []”).
16 But see, MCL 769.1f(2) , which permits the reimbursement of costs associated with investigating and prosecuting certain offenses.
17 The court may award restitution for governmental costs “expended . . . beyond the ordinary costs of investigation or operation[]” if the prosecution establishes “with reasonable certainty, the amount of any loss that (1) did not constitute an ordinary, general cost of investigation or operation and (2) was directly caused by [the] defendant’s criminal offense.” Wahmhoff , 319 Mich App at 275-276.
18 The Gaines Court also “reject[ed] the prosecutor’s argument that the trial court could have alternatively ordered the [investigating and prosecuting] costs to be repaid under the general taxing authority of MCL 769.34(6) , . . . [because] ‘ MCL 769.34(6) allows courts to impose only those costs or fines that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.’” Gaines , 306 Mich App at 323-324, n 10, quoting People v Cunningham , 496 Mich 145, 158 n 11 (2014).
19 Note, however, that the trial court did not err when it excluded the victim-insurance company’s legal fees in connection with the defendant’s deposition from the restitution award because the prosecution failed to establish that those fees were investigatory. Fawaz , 299 Mich App at 67.